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The development of highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) 
viruses in poultry in Eurasia accompanied with the increase 
in human infection in 2006 and the recent reemergence of 
poultry outbreaks throughout the region, suggests that the 
virus has not been effectively contained and that the pandemic 
threat persists. Virological and epidemiological findings from 
our surveillance in live-poultry markets conducted over the last 
seven years in southern China has provided a comprehensive 
view of the ecology and evolution of H5N1 influenza viruses 
and revealed that they are endemic in different types of 
market poultry. Genetic and antigenic analyses have also 
demonstrated the dynamic evolution of these viruses in the 
region, with repeated introductions from southern China to 
neighboring regions, including Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. A further dramatic spread of the virus 
westwards throughout Central and Southern Asia, Europe 
and Africa was also seen after detection of an initial outbreak 
in wild birds at Qinghai Lake in Central China, in line with our 
predictions. Genetic analyses revealed that after the H5N1 
influenza viruses had established and been endemic several 
years, they developed into regionally distinct sublineages 
that allowed us to further trace their transmission pathways. 
However, recent surveillance data has revealed the emergence 
and predominance of a single H5N1 virus sublineage in 
poultry since late 2005 that has gradually replaced those 
previously detected multiple regional distinct sublineages in 
China. These viruses have already transmitted to neighboring 
regions thereby resulting in a new transmission and outbreak 
wave in Southeast Asia. The persistence of H5N1 virus since 
it first caused human disease in Hong Kong 11 years ago, as 
demonstrated by its endemicity over a large geographical 
region, along with repeated disease outbreaks in both poultry 
and humans indicates that it will be a long-term and difficult 
task to bring this virus under control in the absence of well 
developed disease control systems. 
Introduction
Extensive surveillance and genetic studies have revealed that 
highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses have become 
first predominant and then endemic in poultry in southern 
China and Southeast Asia since 2003 [1]. This resulted in 
the establishment of multiple distinct regional sublineages 
[2]. The recognition of multiple different H5N1 sublineages 
makes it possible to identify the source, and to understand 
the evolutionary and transmission pathways of those H5N1 
viruses that have become widespread in Southeast Asia, 
Europe and Africa. Since H5N1 influenza virus caused the 
first outbreak in migratory waterfowls at Qinghai Lake in May 
2005 [3], a new transmission and outbreak wave was initiated. 
The virus expanded its geographical distribution and caused 
outbreaks in poultry in over 60 countries from Central Asia, 
the Middle East, Europe and Africa [4]. This led directly to a 
marked increase in human infection cases and escalated the 
pandemic threat. From Jan 2006 to June 2007 the World Health 
Organization (WHO) confirmed 170 cases from 12 countries; 
while for the period 2003 to 2005 there was a total of 148 
cases from just five countries [5]. Also, in Indonesia there were 
suspected cases of human-to-human transmission involving 
members of an extended family and the infection sources 
of other human cases have not been identified [6]. In China, 
despite a compulsory program for the vaccination of all poultry 
commencing in September 2005 [7], H5N1 influenza virus has 
caused outbreaks in poultry in 12 provinces from October 
2005 to August 2006 [4]. At the same time, twenty-two human 
infection cases have been confirmed from 14 provinces since 
November 2005 [4, 5]. Some of those cases were residents 
of metropolitan areas remote from poultry farms, such as 
Guangzhou, Wuhan and Shanghai [4]. Furthermore, there were 
no obvious poultry outbreaks reported in neighboring markets 
or farms before or after the onset of those human infections. So 
whether those people were infected locally and directly from 
affected poultry or other sources, including humans, is still 
unknown. This situation directly challenges current pandemic 
preparedness plans, raising concern that a pandemic could 
emerge not only from countryside but also from an urban 
area, just as SARS emerged from the live-animal markets of 
Guangzhou and the Pearl River Delta [8, 9]. 
Results
Surveillance. From July 2005 to June 2006 our ongoing influenza 
surveillance in live-poultry markets in six provinces of southern 
China showed that 1,294 of 53,220 (overall isolation rate 2.4%) 
poultry were H5N1 positive. The main body of H5N1 isolates 
was from duck and goose, with only a small number isolated 
from chicken (chicken 0.5%, duck 3.3%, goose 3.5%). The 
prevalence of H5N1 viruses in southern China has increased 
when compared to the period July 2004 to June 2005 (overall 
0.9%, chicken 0.2%, duck 1.3%, goose 2.0%). A winter-seasonal 
peak was observed from October 2005 to March 2006 as in 
previous years [1, 2]), during which H5N1 influenza viruses were 
isolated in each province tested. However, an extension of the 
peak season was observed in April to June 2006 as isolation 
rates remained high in these warmer months. Comparison 
between different types of poultry shows that H5N1 viruses 
were mainly isolated from domestic duck and goose wherein 
the viruses were prevalent year-round, while chicken tested 
positive mostly during the winter. It is notable that in the last 
12 months, H5N1 positive chicken were detected in 11 months, 
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a marked increase from only four positive months in 2004/05 
(data not shown). These findings indicate an escalation of H5N1 
activity in poultry in 2005/06 compared to previous years. 
These findings suggest that H5N1 influenza viruses have not 
been effectively contained in this region and have maintained 
endemicity broadly in poultry, especially domestic duck and 
goose. 
Phylogenetic Analysis. To better understand the increased 
prevalence of H5N1 in poultry and the emergence of human 
infection in China, 390 (30% of total new isolates) of those avian 
H5N1 influenza viruses isolated from July 2005 to June 2006, 
plus 16 viruses isolated from smuggled poultry and dead wild 
birds in Hong Kong in early 2006, were sequenced and analyzed 
together with sequences available from public databases. 
Phylogenetic analysis of the hemagglutinin (HA) gene revealed 
that 266 of 390 (68%) of those recent H5N1 viruses from 
southern China, formed a distinct H5N1 sublineage (Fujian 
(FJ)-like, Clade 2.3.4) (Figure 1). Twenty-eight viruses isolated 
in Guiyang from November 2005 to January 2006 formed a 
sublineage (GY2, Clade 2.3.3) that is the sister-group to the 
Fujian-like sublineage (Figure 1). Another three sublineages 
from Guangdong (GD/06, Clade 2.5, n=6), Guiyang (GY1, Clade 
4, n=14) and Yunnan (YN2, Clade 7, n=13) were also identified. 
A further 59 viruses grouped in the Mixed/VNM2 sublineage 
(Clade 2.3.2), while only a single virus (Gf/ST/1341/06) belonged 
to the QH-like sublineage (Clade 2.2) currently circulating in 
Africa and Europe (Figure 1). The remaining viruses analyzed in 
this study belonged to previously reported sublineages from 
China and Southeast Asia, except two isolates from Hunan (Ck/
HN/2246/06 and Ck/HN/2292/06), isolated in May 2006 that do 
not fall with any of these sublineages. The prototype virus of 
the FJ-like sublineage (Dk/FJ/1734/05) was detected in March 
2005. From July to September 2005, only a single strain of 33 
sequenced viruses was FJ-like (Table 1). 
table 1. Number of viruses from the Fujian-like sublineage in China.
Remarkably, from October 2005 onwards the percentage of 
FJ-like viruses detected increased dramatically, until from April 
to June 2006, 103 of 108 (95%) of H5N1 poultry isolates tested 
were FJ-like (Table 1). Viruses from other sublineages were not 
detected in our surveillance since October 2005, November 
2005, March 2006, April 2006 and May 2006, respectively. 
These findings reflect the process of FJ-like viruses gradually 
becoming predominant in this region. Phylogenetic analysis 
also revealed that the HA gene of five recent human H5N1 
viruses from different provinces of China [4, 10, 11] belong to 
this FJ-like sublineage and were most closely related to poultry 
isolates.  This suggests that H5N1 human infection from China 
since November 2005 were infected directly from affected 
poultry. Furthermore, H5N1 viruses isolated in early 2006 from 
neighboring regions of mainland China, including the 16 Hong 
Kong viruses and two poultry isolates from Laos and Malaysia, 
all joined the FJ-like sublineage. 
Figure 1. Phylogenetic relationships of the HA genes of representative 
influenza A viruses isolated in Asia. Trees were generated by the neighbor-
joining method in the PAUP* program. Numbers above or below branches 
indicate neighbor-joining bootstrap values. Not all supports are shown due to 
space constraints. Analysis was based on nucleotides 1–1011 and the tree was 
rooted to A/Tern/South Africa/61. Scale bar, 0.01 substitutions per site. 
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Discussion
The emergence of this FJ-like sublineage has had similar 
consequences to the first wave of virus transmission throughout 
Southeast Asia in early 2004 [1] and the second wave to Europe 
and Africa that followed the Qinghai Lake H5N1 outbreak [3, 
4]. The findings of our study show that this virus has replaced 
most of those previously established regional sublineages 
across a large geographical area in China [2). The predominance 
of this FJ-like virus appears to be responsible for the increased 
prevalence of H5N1 in poultry since October 2005 and recent 
human infection cases in China [4, 5]. Furthermore, it has 
already caused poultry outbreaks in Laos, Malaysia, Thailand 
and Vietnam [4, 5]. As such, this variant has already initiated a 
third wave of transmission throughout Southeast Asia, and may 
spread further in Eurasia. It is also probable that this virus will 
continue to evolve to form other regionally distinct sublineages 
as witnessed with the H5N1 genotype viruses in the first and 
second transmission waves [1, 2]. Previously we have described 
the establishment of multiple sublineages of H5N1 virus in 
southern China and Southeast Asia [2]. The emergence and 
replacement of these sublineages by FJ-like viruses within 
a short period of time highlights the difficulties faced in 
controlling H5N1 virus in China. A complex ecology and highly 
diverse virus populations make it almost impossible to capture 
each circulating virus sublineage even with the application of 
mass vaccination. This has resulted in recurrent H5N1 outbreaks 
in poultry in different regions and led to occasional human 
infection. 
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